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1

PROCEEDINGS

2

(Court called to order at 2:41 p.m.)
3

THE CLERK:
4

Zeran versus America Online., Incorporated.

5

Counsel, please note your appearances.

6

7

THE COURT:

All right, who is here on behalf

of the plaintiff?

8
9

Civil Action 96-1564, Kenneth

ATTORNEY EDWARDS:
Edwards.

Your Honor, I am John

I am a member of the Bar of this Court.

With me

10

is Leo Leo Kayser, for whom I would like to make a motion

11

that he be admitted for purposes of this case.

12

He is a member of the Bar of the State of

13

New York, the Second Circuit, the District of Columbia,

14

and the United States District Court.

15

admission for purposes of this case.

16
17

THE COURT:

I would offer his

The motion pro hac to have Mr.

Kayser appear on behalf of the defendant is granted.

18

We are glad · to have you here, Mr. Kayser.

19

ATTORNEY KAYSER:

20

THE COURT:

21

ATTORNEY KLINE:

Thank you, your Honor.

Who is here for the defendant?
Your Honor, Sara Kline, and

22

I would like to introduce Patrick Carome, for whom the

23

motion has already been granted.
THE COURT:

24 .
25

All right.

Who will argue

today?
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1

ATTORNEY CAROME:
2

Patrick Carome for America Online.

3
4

THE COURT:

You may be seated.

9

10

I will tell you where I

stand.

7

8

We are glad to have you here,

Mr. Carome.

5
6

I will, your Honor,

First of all, let me be clear, Mr. Edwards ,
fax filings are not permitted.
the filings.

I found pages missing in

And fax filings, 'however, aren't permitted

in the courthouse.

11

You will have to comply.

"Local counsel" typically means local.

12

Roanoke is not terribly local, but I am going to permit

13

it.

14

on the plaintiff.

15

anything by fax.

But if there is a hardship that results, it will fall

16

In the future, you may not file

RECAPITULATION BY THE COURT

17

THE COURT:

The matter is before · the Court

18

on the defendant's motion to dismiss or motion for

19

judgment on the pleadings.

20

application of

21

defendant contends is applicable to the facts of this

22

case.

23

~he

The motion is based on the

Communications Decency Act, which the

This case comes here on transfer from the

24

Western District of Oklahoma, and the issues raised

25

involve the application of Section 230 of the
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

Communications Decency Act and also on whether, even if

2

applicable, the allegation of a negligence cause of action

3

in some way avoids the application of the statute.

4

Mr. Carome, let me hear from you first.

5

might -- and I think you should focus to some extent,

6

although you may argue whatever issues you think need

7

emphasis, but you should focus on those two, principally,

8

namely the application of the statute and whether the

9

statute, even if applicable, would stand in the way of a

10

You

negligence suit.

11

ATTORNEY CAROME:

12

Thank you, your Honor.

ARGUMENT BY THE DEFENDANT

13

ATTORNEY CAROME:

I believe that the briefs

14

have crystallized two issues.

15

or not Mr. Zeran's suit is one to treat America Online as

16

the publisher or speaker on information posted on America

17

Online interacted on by a third person.

18

of the Communications Decency Act mainly prohibits any

19

treatment of America Online as the publisher or speaker of

20

such third-party --

21

THE COURT:

22

what he said.

23

publisher or speaker.

24

distributor.

25

The first issue is whether

The Section 230

He says -- you ought to focus on

He says this doesn't speak to them as a
It seeks to hold them as a

ATTORNEY CAROME:

I think there are three
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1

respects, your Honor, in which Mr. Zeran's suit treats

2

America Online as the publ1'sher of th'1rd-party content.

3

First, such a suit, regardless of how it is

4

labeled, seeks to put America Online in precisely the same

5

legal position as the original publisher of these messages

6

could be put in a defamation suit or any other suit for

7

harm arising out of this content.
The original publisher is obviously the

8
9

publisher.

To threat America Online legally identically

10

in terms of damages imposed, would be to treat America

11

Online as the publisher of the third-party content.
Secondly, it is well-settled under the

12
13

common law throughout this country that liability for harm

14

caused by defamatory statements -- and that's what we have

15

here, we have allegedly defamatory, bogus statements

16

that suits for such harms are only properly brought

17

against parties who are treated as publishers.
Here, clearly, to hold America Online

18

19
20

21

responsible for damages caused by third-party posted
messages would do exactly what your typical defamation
suit would do.
Thirdly, the duties that Mr. Zeran's suit

22
seeks to impose on America Online are the quintessential
23

activities of a publisher.

He seeks to have America

24

Online, whenever there is any defamatory message posted on
25
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1

the system by a third party, be under a duty, once told of

2

that situation, first to publish some form of reaction or

3

notice --

4

THE COURT:

Let me ask you this:

Does the

5

Communications Decency Act bar any action against an

6

electronic type, like AOL, if the facts were that on one

7

of their bulletin boards, some libelous or some defamatory

8

words were published, and they were advised that they were

9

false and defamatory, and they knew they were false and

10

defamatory, and they didn't remove them?

11

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Yes.

The Communications

12

Decency Act bars such liability.

13

circumstance treats America Online as the publisher of

14

that content.

15

THE COURT:

16

ATTORNEY CAROME:

17

THE COURT:

18

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Liability in that

Treats them as a publisher?
Yes.

So they would be liable.
They would not be liable,

19

because to hold them liable in those circumstances would

20

treat them as a publisher, which is barred by Section 230.

21

THE COURT:

Even after they are told that it

22

is defamatory and they know that it's defamatory, let's

23

say there are documents and admissions, and they

24

nonetheless do it?

25

ATTORNEY CAROME:

That is exactly right.

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

That is exactly what Congress has provided.

2

THE COURT:

Now, where do you see that in

3

either the language or in any of the history of the

4

statute?

5

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Well, your Honor, as

I

6

indicated, to impose liabilities in those circumstances ,

7

your Honor, would mean that every time there was a

8

complaint against America Online, someone brings to its

9

attention a complaint about content on its system, it

10

would have to essentially have a legion of investigators

11

on hand to investigate that complaint, just as a newspaper

12

would.

13
14
15

THE COURT:

But a newspaper does have

responsibility.
ATTORNEY CAROME:

That is absolutely right.

16

And a newspaper is -- when you sue a newspaper for the

17

content in the newspaper, you have treated that newspaper

18

as the publisher of that content.

19

perfectly permissible as to a newspaper.

20

However, a suit

21 -

THE COURT:

And when -- and that's

If you substituted a newspaper

22

for America Online in the hypothetical I gave you, there

23

probably would be liability.

24
25

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Absolutely, your Honor.

It is very clear that section 230 was intended to

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1
2

eliminate liability for entities such as America Online.
The act provides for --

3

4

THE COURT:

Now, let's suppose that instead

of something appearing on America Online about some or one

5

of their subscribers, that America Online decided for one

6

reason for another to defame somebody and started putting

7

stuff on.

B
9

Is there any liability?
ATTORNEY CAROME:

Yes, there potentially

would be liability, your Honor, because __

10

THE COURT:

11

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Why?
That would not be

12

Section 230 states that no provider or user of an

13

interactive computer service -- that is, America Online

14

shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
~

15

information provided by another --

16

THE COURT:

17

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Is this received by another?
-- by another contact

This is a circumstance of your hypothetical

18

provider.

19

which would not have been information provided by another

20

information content provider.

21

THE COURT:

All right, address briefly the

22

application of the Act, in view of the Act.

23

your argument that the Act would -- or construing the Act

24

not to cover events prior to the effective date of the

25

Act, would render, would render meaningless the statement

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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10

1

that no liability would be imposed.

2

ATTORNEY CAROME·.

Yes.

Your Honor, are you

3

asking me to address what the plaintiff refers to as the

4

retroactivity issue?

5

THE COURT:

6

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Yes.
Under the leading case

7

here, which obviously is the Supreme Court's decision in

8

Land Graph, it specifies a two-part analysis in

9

determining the --

10
11

THE COURT:
statute.

start with the language of the

This statute now became effective

12

ATTORNEY CAROME.:

13

THE COURT:

On February 8, 1996 •

And these events all took place

14

prior to the effective date, although the suit was filed,

15

of course, long after the effective date, and the statute

16

itself, 230, states that no cause of action may be

17

brought -- and you say that's the end of the matter,

18

because this was a cause of action brought afterwards.

19

But then you go on to say that the fact that

20

no liability may be imposed underscores the fact that the

21

activities don't have to occur after the effective date of

22

the statute, or that language would be meaningless.
ATTORNEY CAROME:

That is absolutely

23
24

correct, your Honor.
THE COURT:

And then you go through the

25

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1
2

Land Graph -- why is there any -- are there any decisions
considering this?

3

4

It would seem that the Stratton/Oakmont
[phonetic] case --

5
6

ATTORNEY CAROME:
which predated --

7

THE COURT:

8

ATTORNEY CAROME:

9

The Stratton/Oakmont case,

The Prodigy case.
That's correct, your

Honor.

10

THE COURT:

There is no authority, I take

11

it, considering whether Section 230(c) should apply to

12

cases brought after the ~ffective date of the act, but

13

involving activities that occurred prior to the act.

14
15

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Yes.

There is, as a

matter of fact, there is a point --

16

THE COURT:

Let's go back for a moment --

17

because it's late in the afternoon, and you'll have an

18

opportunity for rebuttal because you have the burden.

19

- There is obviously, you say, a creative

20

litigant.

21

complimentary, that is how the law regards it in this

22

country, that is, creative lawyers and excessively

23

creative lawyers and judges.

fa---. '
25

That's -meant to be pejorative.

It' is

But in any event, they are framing it as a
negligence claim.

And your response to that I understand,

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

but give me some authority where there has been, this

2

particular point has been raised; in other words, where

3

there has been some immunity for publishing and the effort

4

to circumvent that has been to frame it in negligence

5

terms.

Is that the Molday [phonetic] case?

6

ATTORNEY CAROME:

The cases that we

7

discussed at pages 13 and 14 of our main brief, including

8

Hustler versus Falwell and the Molday case, are examples

9

of cases where plaintiffs have sought to avoid the

10

protections of publisher liability by trying to plead a

11

case as negligence, or negligent infliction of emotional

12

distress.

13
14
15
16

The courts in those cases have uniformly
recognized that when a plaintiff
THE COURT:

Just a moment.

have to be quiet at counsel table.

You are going to

I can hear it up here.

17

Go ahead.

18

ATTORNEY CAROME:

19

The cases recognize that if the protection

Thank you, your Honor.

20

is against defamation liability, which defamation

21

liability is a cause of action for the negligent

22

publishing of false and harmful information, if that tort

23

could -- and the protections also that go with it could be

24

avoided simply by pleading just a straight negligence case

25

or a negligent infliction of emotional distress case, then
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1

every single defamation would easily be converted into a

2

straight negligence action, with none of the panoply of

3

protection that this Court has recognized for that sort of

4

publishing liability.

5

If that could be done in this case, that

6

simply by relabeling the cause of action as one for simple

7

negligence and cause for negligent distribution, then

8

there would be no protection in section 230 for, for

9

precisely this sort of situation.

10
11

Congress clearly intended to remove from
interactive service providers -THE COURT:

12
13

That is a conclusion that is

something I have to determine.

14

Let me ask you this:

Plaintiffs obviously,

15

plaintiff obviously relies quite heavily on the Cubby

16

case, the duty to screen case.

17

been decided in '91, would have found some mention or

18

reference in the legislative history or argument in the

19

Congress.

20

Surely that case, having

Did you find that?
ATTORNEY CAROME:

There is no reference,

21

your Honor, in the legislative history, as far as I

22

of the Cubby case.

23

one of the purposes of the statute is to overturn Prodigy

24

and similar cases.

25

know,

The legislative history says that the,

Prodigy is the only other case that I am

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

aware of, and it has been cited to the Court, in which an

2

online service provider has been held liable for the

3

tortious content put on its service by a third party.

4
5
6
7

8

9

Congress certainly was intending to remove
the burden of such liability from online services when
. they are acting in this intermediary capacity, as in this
case.
And speaking of Cubby, there is no possible
way to draw out of Gubby

~his

10

negligent distribution.

In fact, I am not aware of any

11

case which holds --

12
13
14

THE COURT:

notion of a tort of

All right, tell me about Cubby.

It's New York Law.
ATTORNEY CAROME:

Cubby was New York Law.

15

There were three causes of action that were plead.

16

Kayser was counsel for Cubby, as I understand it.

17

Mr.

The first cause of action was for

18

defamation, and the Court framed -- which defamation

19

treats the defendant as a publisher, because pUblication

20

is one of the first and foremost elements of any

21

defamation claim.

22

The Court said in that case that the

23

question that the Cubby case presented was whether or not

24

the rule that one who repeats a defamatory statement is

25

liable as if he originally published it, should apply in

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1
2

the circumstances.
Cubby, there were also tort for -- I am

3

going to forget for this disparagement, and there is

4

another similar tort in each of the three torts.

5

The Cubby Court made clear that CompuServe,

6

the defendant in that case, could be held liable if there

7

were facts establishing that it was the publisher.

S

What Mr. Kayser has done, through his

9

creativity, is to suggest that a special protection which

10

the Cubby Court applied for computer contributors, namely

11

the protection rooted in the First Amendment, for, that no

12

defamation liability can be imposed, or other liabilities

13

for third-party contact can be imposed on a distributor,

14

absent knowledge or reason to know of the defamation.

15

That simply was a special protection rooted in the

16

Constitution for a distributor.

17

But it was a -- if that protection was

18

overcome in any case, it was only to apply to the

19

defamation tort, which would treat the defendant as a

20

publisher, as quintessentially the defamation tort, which

21

was the leading tort at issue in the Cubby versus

22

CompuServe case.

23

It just completely stands Cubby on its head

24

to read out of it some new tort of negligent distribution.

25

That isn't the case tort which treat intermediaries as

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

responsible for the harm caused by a third person's

2

speech, or by defamation torts which treat the

3

intermediary as the publisher.

4

notion of a negligent distribution basis for, as liable

5

that, that can't change the application of Section 230 to

6

this case.

7

And for that reason, this

And if it could, Section 230 would have

8

absolutely no meaning, which clearly you say is a

9

conclusion.

But I think one cannot draw anything from

10

both the legislative history and, even more importantly,

11

the findings and policy that are expressly stated in

12

Section 230, that Congress clearly intended to remove from

13

interactive service providers the risk of liability when

14

they are acting -- the risk of liability for the content

15

posted on their service by third parties.

16

It is clear, for example, from Section 230,

17

Part (b), which is the policy statement, it is the policy

18

of the united States to promote the continued development

19

of the Internet and other interactive computer services,

20

and other acts of intermedia, to provide the computer,

21

that presently exist for the Internet and other

22

interactive computer services undeterred by federal or

23

state legislation.

24

25

Here, and lastly Congress doesn't --

Congress does not ignore the fact that there was a serious
MICHAEL A. RODRIOUEZ. RPR/cM/RMR
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1

issue, a serious policy issue concerning harmful content

2

that is transmitted over the Internet or interactive

3

service providers.

4

That is why in the last of the policy

5

statements of Section 230, Congress reaches out and says

6

that it is the policy of the United States to insure

7

vigorous enforcement of federal criminal laws to deter and

8

punish -- to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,

9

stalking and harassment by means of computer.

10

Here, Congress made a fundamental choice

11

this is a very exciting, still in infancy, technology,

12

that is revolutionizing the way computers are

13

communicating in the united States and the world.

14

Congress did want to remove from the

15

participants, the intermediary participants, in that

16

revolution the risk of liability for third-party content.

17

And Congress coincidentally also said, and

18

indicated by this last policy statement, that the way to

19

deal ·with this problem of harm caused by third-party

20

content is to go after the harassers and the stalkers and

21

the others who are posting harmful content directly, but

22

to not burden the Internet and the interactive service

23

providers with liability for third-party content.

24

THE COURT:

25

Mr. Kayser?

All right, thank you.

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

ARGUMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF

~

ATTORNEY KAYSER:

May it please the Court, I

3

would like to address the Court on the substantive issues

4

with respect to Section 230.

5

Court permits, but if it does, Mr. Edwards would talk

6

about the retroactivity issue to the Court.

And I don't know if the

The legislative history of Section 230 is

7

8

best summarized in this conference agreement, which is not

9

in either brief, but which I have a copy here and I would

10

like to read.
THE COURT:

11

12

relevance that it's not in either brief.
ATTORNEY KAYSER:

13

14

It must be some sign of its

I didn't have it, your

Honor, before.

15

The conference agreement adopts the House

16

provision with my modification as a new Section 230 of the

17

Communications Act.

18

protection from civil liability for providers or users of

19

an interactive computer service for actions to restrict or

20

to enable restriction of access to objectionable online

21

material.

This section provides good Samaritan

THE COURT:

22

Doesn't that just say that if

23

you do take steps to screen, you wouldn't be held

24

responsible

25

ATTORNEY KAYSER:

Exactly.

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

THE COURT:

2

It doesn't say you have to take screening

3

efforts.

4

trying to do it.

It says if you do, you wouldn't be penalized for

5

ATTORNEY KAYSER:

6

is correct.

7

the Stratton/Oakmont case.

8
9

for doing it negligently?

That is exactly it, that

It was done in the wake of the Cubby case and

The next sentence is one of the specific
purposes of this section to overrule the Stratton/Oakmont

10

against Prodigy and any other similar decisions, which

11

have treated such providers and users as publishers and

12

speakers of content.

13

That is not -- this is not their own,

14

because they restricted access to objectionable material.

15

This provision was adopted knowing about the Cubby, Inc.,

16

CompuServe case, which is also cited with approval, where

17

Stratton/Oakmont applied the provision that if you had

18

knowledge, then you would be deemed a publisher if you

19

actually took action.
What this legislation did was to encourage

20

21

the service provider to take action after notice, or

22

before if they chose to; but in either event would not be

23

deemed to be a publisher or speaker, as Stratton/Oakmont

24

had so held.

25

And other than that, that is what Section
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

230 does.

2

3

THE COURT:

I

don't think there is any

disagreement from the defendant on that.

4

ATTORNEY KAYSER:

Well, the defendant goes

5

further and says that Section 230 does more than that, and

6

says that any content at any time, provided exempted by, I

7

think, America Online itself, for example, no matter what,

8

how damaging it might be, and it does not limit it to

9

defamation.

10

This case is not just a defamation case.

11

The telephone number of the plaintiff was used.

12

telephone number had been blocked out -- it actually goes

13

directly to a direct privacy issue -- then these phone

14

calls that have threatened his life couldn't have happened

15

in the wake of what did occur here.

16

If that

And in fact, the action, part of the action

17

that was asked to be taken, to actually block out and

18

screen his phone calls --

19

THE COURT:

The only claim made here is the

20

negligence claim.

21

negligence.

22

than damage, but the only claim made is negligence.

23
24

25

There is no claim made here other than

It may be that you are saying something other

ATTORNEY KAYSER:

That is correct.

And the

claim is limited simply to the fact that they should

have -- that America Online should have known that they
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR
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1

should have had a compilation team in place, standard of

2

care, they had a duty.

3

They already know they had a duty to take

4

care of situations which may arise with respect to

5

incendiary, dangerous information that could have

6

threatened someone's life in this case, or appear to

7

threaten someone's life, where there were death threats,

8

where they would be in a position to do something with

9

that content, glean it out in some way, after notice.

10

Nothing had to be done before that.

Section

11

230 requires notice to do that, and not deem them the

12

publisher.

13

capacity as distributor.

This is a duty imposed upon them in the

The cases that the defendant cites to claim

14

15

that this is publisher liability that is being sought, are

16

some common law cases, for example, a bartender who didn't

17

remove graffiti in a bathroom after notice, things of that

18

nature, which then deemed it to be a pUblication of --

19

that is out of the common law court.
It was not in the context of construing a

20

21

statute which modifies the common law.

22

that statute should be strictly construed when it comes to

23

modification of common law doctrine, wasn't being applied

24

in that case.

25

And the old adage

So, a court would not be looking at the
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1

effect of negligence -- just common law negligence is what

2

we are talking about here, your Honor -- as to whether or

3

not there would be some other operation that had to be

4

taken into account, some other term to be used to do

5

justice in the case.

6

So, those cases did not have something to

7

look at in terms of doing justice, in terms of assessing

8

or attaching responsibility.

9

There were a couple other points in terms of

10

assistance to the Court in the construction of section

11

230.

12

cited in the brief of the plaintiff, in opposition, which

13

is Section 223.

14

There is another section to the statute, which is

There was no response to this argument that

15

was in the defendant's brief, and I think for good reason.

16

It expressly provides that when a service provider is in a

17

position to control content, and is -- presumably, if it

18

is brought to its attention it should be in such control,

19

could be in such control, then liability can attach.

20

And so there is clearly not a blanket

21

exemption for whatever content can be on the system at any

22

time, with no exceptions, which is basically the argument

23

that is being advanced by the defendant.

24
25

This basically concludes my presentation to
the Court on this issue, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

1
2

All right.

Thank you, Mr.

Kayser.
Mr. Edwards?

3

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF

4

ATTORNEY EDWARDS:

5

On the question of

6

retroactivity, the parting point for the analysis of

7

whether a statute is retroactive or not is the landmark

8

Land Graph case, which is a 1994 case, I believe.

9

there, the Supreme Court basically enunciated construction

10

that there is a strong presumption of prospective

11

applic~tion

12

have retroactive application.

And

of statutes, just like case law, of course,

But this is a strong presumption of

13
14

prospective application because of the fairness doctrine,

15

basically.

16

clear expression of legislative intent that it be

17

retroactive, and only when also it doesn't conflict with

18

the Constitution, such as protection -- protected rights

19

of the Constitution, that then could the courts say that a

20

substantive law would have retroactive application.

And it's only when Congress establishes a

Now, the rule with regard to procedure

21

22

matters is somewhat different, because there can be an

23

implication in case of statute of limitations and other

24

procedural matters that don't apply in this particular

25

case.
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1

The defendant in this case hangs its hat on

2

Section 230 language, which says no cause of action may be

3

brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or

4

local law that is inconsistent with this section.

S

That has nothing whatsoever to do with

6

retroactivity.

7

the preemption of state and local laws that differ, that

8

are inconsistent from this section.

9

to do with it.

10

That has to do with the supremacy clause,

That's all that had

It has nothing whatsoever to do with

proactive or prospective.

11

THE COURT:

Would the common law principle

12

that you are seeking to have applied here, that is

13

negligence, be a state or local law?

14

15

ATTORNEY EDWARDS:

be --

16

17

The common law would

THE COURT:

A law, if it is inconsistent,

would apply, wouldn't it?

18

ATTORNEY EDWARDS:

If it were inconsistent

19

after the Act becomes effective.

20

Act, I am saying, does not even apply to Section 230, the

21

Communications Decency Act does not apply to the facts of

22

this case, because it didn't go into effect until some

23

eight months or so after the events which occurred here.

24

If the Court rules that the Communications

25

Decency Act

But in this case, the

is not retroactive in application, then
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1
2

Section 230 and all these other arguments simply don't
apply at all.

3

In effect, I

guess, in some ways we are

4

getting the cart before the horse.

5

well be:

Does it have retroactive application?

6

7

The question could

And if the answer is "No," as we contend it
is only prospective, then that decides the case.

8

You can also turn it the other way around

9

and say Section 230 does not limit the negligence claim

10

that has been brought here, because of distribution

11

liability, and that's in the analysis as well.

12

i t either way.

You can do

13

You can do it, is what I am saying, in the

14

Land Graph case, where there was -- that, of course, was

15

an interpretation of the 1991 act, amendment to Title 7.

16

And from the language in the statute, it

17

said that the amendment would have application to pending

18

cases, and even there the Court said it was not

19

retroactive.

20

Here, there is nothing like that at all.

21

There is nothing in this Communications Decency Act that

22

would suggest that Congress had any intention to make it

23

retroactive at all.

24
25

Since it didn't go into effect until
February 1996, and the acts that the cause of action grew
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1

out of in this case were in April or May of 1995, it is

2

clear that we have a statute here that has no application

3

whatsoever to this case.

4

the common law in this case with regard to distribution

5

liability.

Nor is there any reason to upset

As I mentioned earlier, it is only in the

6
7

cases, I believe, that were cited by the defendant in his

8

brief, where there was retroactive application, that was a

9

procedural and jurisdictional matter, and not subjective

10

matter.
I think the Land Graph case actually bases

11
12

the burden of proving, of arguing that a statute has

13

retroactive application by looking to clear language in

14

the statute, and there is none in this case to suggest

15

that Congress intended for it to have retroactive

16

application.

17
18

19
20

21
22

23
24

I would be happy to answer any questions.
otherwise, I would close my argument.

Basically, since

there is no expression of legislative intent to make it
retroactive, it can't be retroactive.
THE COURT:

Mr. Carome?

ATTORNEY CAROME:

Thank you, your Honor.

ARGUMENT BY THE DEFENDANT
THE COURT:

What about Section 2231

ATTORNEY CAROME:

section 223 does not alter

25

MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR

27
1

the analysis at all.

2

230 itself -- excuse me -- specifically says that it has

3

no effect .on -- I am referring to Section 230(d)(1) -- no

4

effect on criminal law.

5

First, I wili point out that Section

It says:

"Nothing in this section shall be

6

construed to impair the enforcement of Section

7

223 of this Act ...

8
9

What I submit, your Honor, is that Section
223 is an extremely narrow criminal statute directed at

10

particular obscene and indecent communications, and that

11

don't agree with Mr. Kayser's treatment of it.

12

I

But in any event, even if there is some

13

tension between the treatment of an interactive service

14

provider in 223 and the provision that there can be no

15

treatment of an interactive service provider as a provider

16

of third-party content, that tension was perhaps

17

recognized by Congress and it specifically said that there

18

would be -- that section 223 would override the effect of

19

Section 230, perhaps, but only in that very limited

20

criminal circumstance.

21

And so to suggest that 223 suggests some

22

sort of different treatment of an interactive service

23

provider, which we certainly do not intend to suggest that

24

it does, is irrelevant to an interpretation of Section

25

230, because Section 230 specifically says that it has
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1

nothing to do with Section 223 liability.

2
3

THE COURT:

Address very briefly, then, the

Land Graph argument.

4

ATTORNEY CAROME:

There are two steps to the

5

Land Graph argument.

6

Congress has expressly provided for the temporal reach of

7

the statute.
Our position is, and I think it is clear,

8
9

First, you look to see whether

that the statutory language, no cause of action may be

10

brought and no liability brought that is inconsistent with

11

this section.
That language is, could not be any clearer,

12

c~se

13

that it prohibits the imposition in any

14

forward that's inconsistent with Section 230.

15

Mr. Zeran's construction, you have to read into that

16

provision an exception which would say, "Except for cases

17

where the cause of action had already accrued before

18

enactment of this action, no cause may be brought and no

19

liability be imposed.

20

exception in the language of the statute.

21

I

from that day
To achieve

Obviously, there is no such

would invite the CoUrt's attention to a

22

case that I didn't, frankly, notice, when we did our reply

23

brief, and that I feel helps us substantially on this

24

expressed language point, which is the Lynn v. Murphy

25

case, which says -- which is a case that Mr. Zeran
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1

2

incorrectly cited as going the other way.
That case held that when there is language

3

in a statute that is of a prohibition in nature

4

clearly nothing is more clearly a prohibition, "no

5

liability is imposed" -- then that such language should

6

apply to all cases brought after that date.

7

and

Similarly, Lynn says that normally when the

8

language of a statute speaks to the power of a court --

9

and here, clearly, the language that "no liability may be

10

imposed" -- speaks to the power of a court, that such

11

language also is properly and expressly understood as

12

applying to all cases from that date forward.

13

Alternatively, even if you didn't agree with

14

the proposition that the statute was expressed on this

15

point, you would still have to then go through the Land

16

Graph analysis as to whether or not, applying Section 230

17

to preenactment events, would have a retroactive effect.

18

And that is a term of art, that's not at all the way

19

opposing counsel has used that term.

20

Land Graph says a statute does not operate

21

retroactively merely because it is applied in a case

22

arising from preenactment conduct.

Rather, you have -to

23

look at the effect of the statute.

And there is a

24

three-part test.

25

Does the statute increase a party's
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1

liability for past conduct? is first.

2
3

Second, does it impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed?

4
5

Or third, does it impair rights a party

possess when he acted?

6

The first two tests clearly have no

7

applicability here.

8

party's liabilities for past conduct, nor does it impose

9

new duties on anyone.

10

Section 230 does not increase a

So, the only question under Land Graph then

11

is whether -- and this is as to whether there is a

12

retroactive effect -- is whether application of section

13

230 to preenactment conduct would impair rights a party

14

possessed when he acted.

15

I submit that it is clear that this statute

16

and its application to preenactment events clearly doesn't

17

do that.

18

whatsoever in reliance on some assumed right to sue

19

America Online.

20

It's clear that Mr. Zeran took no action

In these circumstances, the rug was not

21

pulled out from under him in any respect, other than that

22

he went and hired an attorney and prepared a lawsuit.

23

Clearly, that's not an impairment of a right a party

24

possessed when he acted.

25

In addition, the notion that there
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1

settled right here that any parties had to sue an online

2

provider in these circumstances is a complete fallacy.
Neither of my respected opposing counsel has

3
4

suggested a single case, other than Cubby -- which I

5

they have completely misconstrued -- that posed an action

6

of negligent distribution to an online service provider.
And that's not surprising, because we are

7

8

still in a state where this is the infancy of this

9

communications medium, and the law is just barely

10

say

beginning to address it.

11

So, the notion there are settled rights the

12

parties have in that context, I would submit is clearly

13

wrong.

14

Lastly, the Supreme Court in Land Graph

15

indicated that this question of impairment of rights a

16

party possessed when he acted is not -- that also is a

17

term of art, which has in mind vested rights.

18

is a long line of cases which we have cited at pages 18

19

and 19 of our reply brief, which states it is well-settled

20

that a prospective or even a pending tort action does not

21

constitute a vested right.

If the Court has no further questions, I

22
23

will conclude.

THE COURT:

24

25

And there

Well,

it's page 20, and not 18

and 19.
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1

ATTORNEY CAROME:

2

THE COURT:

is somewhat novel.

4

fairly promptly and I will take the matter under

5

advisement.

7
S
9
10

12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20

21
22

23
24
25

It's an interesting .point.

3

6

11

I'm sorry.
It

I am going to write on the subject

I thank counsel for their cooperation.

I

will write on it chiefly because it is novel.
All right, I thank counsel.

You may call

the last matter.
(Court adjourned in Zeran v. America Online)

